The public's beliefs about the economic impact of immigration on host nations' economies is signicantly more negative than both the beliefs of 
Beggars can't be choosers, you deceive yourself as best you can.
Péter Esterházy (2005) , Celestial Harmonies
Introduction
The economic impact of immigration on host nations' economies is a much studied subject. As with many economic issues, there is a range of opinions amongst economists as to whether immigrants improve or reduce the economic well-being of natives, however the distribution of these opinions is strikingly dierent from the beliefs of the public. The dierence in beliefs between economists and the public is highly signicant: in the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, 80 percent of economists said that excessive immigration was 'not a reason at all' for problems in the economy, whereas 80 percent of the general public regarded it as either a minor or major problem. To begin to explain this disparity we need to develop a model of belief 1 A summary of the survey results can be found at http://www.k.org/kaiserpolls/1199-econgen.cfm 2 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) 3 Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2009) 4 Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the literature on this question does not provide much support for this conclusion. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) . A more up to date survey of empirical literature can be found in Blanchower et al. (2007) . For a dissenting opinion see Borjas (2003) 5 Gott and Johnston (2002) ; Nana and Williams (1999) formation. This paper presents a simple model of belief formation based on the concept of motivated reasoning: when coming to a conclusion, people are inuenced by the desire to come to a particular conclusion, and by the desire for their conclusion to be justied by evidence. Following the terminology of Kunda (1990) , the former is a directional goal, the latter an accuracy goal. This combination of preferences gives agents an incentive to manipulate their beliefs.
The model yields several testable hypotheses: beliefs that run counter to the desired conclusion are less likely to be held by people with stronger directional goals; the eect of the accuracy goal depends crucially on the relative strength of the directional goal; nally, beliefs should reect the probability of receiving supporting evidence.
The implications of this general model are tested for the specic example of beliefs about the economic impact of immigration: using data on four dierent economic beliefs, and proxies for the strength of directional and accuracy goals from the European Social Survey, probit regressions nd support for all three hypotheses. Beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants are strongly correlated with a number of both attitudinal and economic variables. These results suggest that exisiting empirical work on determinants of attitudes towards immigration needs to be reconsidered.
Motivated reasoning is a well documented psychological phenomenon. A number of studies exist showing a change in reasoning and evaluation of evidence when directional and accuracy goals are present, many of which are summarized in Kunda (1990) , who states:
. . . people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justication of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. . . . In other words, they maintain an illusion of objectivity. To this end, they search memory for those beliefs that could support their desired conclusion.
One experimental example is Taber and Lodge (2006) . This paper looks at how the evaluation of arguments about gun control and armative action depends on the strength of prior attitudes (a measure of a directional goal) and political sophistication (a measure of an accuracy goal). They found that participants in their experiment spent more time considering, and were more likely disregard arguments that opposed a strong prior attitude as compared to arguments that were in agreement. They also found that this eect is greater for those who are more politically sophisticated.
In the context of this paper, the directional goal is to oppose immigration because of an inherent preference against the presence of immigrants in the country. This preference could arise from simply discomfort at being exposed to foreign cultures, a perceived threat to a strongly held idea of national identy, or xenophobia with evolutionary roots.
6 A distrust of foreigners is ubiquitous amongst human (and animal) societies 7 and is simply taken as exogenous in this paper.
The accuracy goal is a desire for one's opinion to be based on fact, possibly to strengthen one's belief and become more persuasive, to reduce cognitive dissonance , or to not appear racist to oneself or others. A preference for accurate beliefs will clearly be favoured by evolution in many circumstances. Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) argue that economic agents who make decisions based on false beliefs will be eliminated from markets. More generally, humanity's desire to gain greater understanding our environment has been essential in the astounding technological progress of the past millenia.
In the model presented in Section 2, the concepts from the theory of motivated reasoning generates demand for beliefs. The supply side is provided by the memory-management model of Benabou and Tirole (2002) . The agent receives some information about the economic impact of immigrants, anything from a media article about a government report to an anecdote from a friend at 6 Peck (1990) shows that outsider exclusion can be favoured by evolution, even when it incurs a large cost 7 (The) xenophobic principle has been documented in virtually every group of animals displaying higher forms of social organization... Human behaviour provides some of the best exemplication of the xenophobia principle. Wilson (2000) the pub. They then process this signal in some way, which may involve either sub-conscious repression of undesirable information, or an attempt to actively convince themselves that the report is just damn lies and statisics, or that the event described in the anecdote was just a one-o occurrence and in no way representative of the world at large. From the information that is retained, the agent forms a belief about the economic impact of immigrants and, based on this belief, forms an opinion on whether immigration numbers should be increased or decreased. The satisfaction they obtain from holding this opinion depends on a utility function that contains both a directional goal (whether the opinion is the one they want to hold), and accuracy goal (how close their opinion is to the belief they have formed).
Two results of the model are reasonably intuitive: rstly, a stronger desire not to live with foreigners results in more eort being put into discounting good news about immigrants, thus a higher chance of believing that immigrants are bad for the economy and holding the opinion that there should be fewer immigrants; secondly, the higher the probability of receiving a positive signal, the less eort is put into discounting it if it arrives.
A more complex result relates to the eect of accuracy goals on directional goals: do strong accuracy goals increase or decrease distortions in opinions due to the presence of a directional goal? On the one hand it seems intuitive that a greater desire for accuracy should reduce distortions, however people who would suer large costs from coming to a conclusion they didn't like may put more eort into justifying the preferred conclusion. There are conicting opinions on this question in the psychology and sociology literature.
8 The model suggests that the eect of a stronger accuracy goal depends on the relative strength of the directional goal. If the directional goal is relatively weak, strengthening the accuracy goal results in less distortion of beliefs and a higher chance of wanting more immigrants; if the directional goal is suciently strong then the agent will want to reduce immigrant numbers regardless of their economic impact, and 8 Jackman and Muha (1984) , for example, contains a review of the inconclusive debate on the eect of education on intergroup negativism.
increasing the accuracy goal leads to more eort being put into manipulating beliefs. This last result is in line with Taber and Lodge.
A slight variation of the model shows how the demand for particular beliefs generated by motivated reasoning can be satised by selection of media sources.
This gives an explanation of the demand for biased media, even for rational agents aware of the bias. The economics literature on attitudes towards immigrants has largely been concerned with identifying the roles of economic and non-economic determinants: do people want to reduce the number of immigrants because it is in their economic self-interest, or because of prejudice or a perceived threat to their national identity. This is of importance to policy-makers who support immigration and those concerned about the discriminatory and often violent treatment of immigrants. If opposition to immigration is largely driven by economic concerns, these can be addressed through relatively simple policies, compensating those who lose out. If opposition is primarily caused by xenophobia, the issue is much more dicult. The empirical results of this paper show that it is extremely dicult to disentangle economic from non-economic factors.
Not surprisingly, racism is one of the strongest determinants of attitudes towards immigrants (Mayda, 2004) . The model of Section 2 suggests that racism has not only a direct eect on attitudes, but also an eect on the formation of beliefs about immigrants and their economic impact. This will aect the other channels through which individual characteristics determine attitudes. For example, it is commonly argued that low-skilled workers should oppose immigration that will increase the ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled workers because of a negative impact on wages predicted by some factor endowment models (and a simple labour supply/labour demand argument). There is econometric evidence to suggest that indeed people do oppose immigration more strongly when immigrants are predominantly of their skill level, and this is treated as evidence that economic, as well as non-economic factors are important in formation of attitudes. However, given that most empirical evidence shows that immigra- The only paper I am aware of that looks in any detail at the determinants of beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants is Thomas K. Bauer and Zimmermann (2000) . The focus of their paper is cross-country dierences in attitudes and how they relate to immigration policy. They use data from the International Social Science Project. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) note that the belief that immigrants are good for the economy is positively correlated with education.
An interesting empirical paper which presents results explained by this model, but not by traditional economic theory is Dustman and Preston (2000) , which looks at whether attitudes to immigration in the UK are associated with racial attitudes, labour market or welfare concerns. They nd that labour market concerns are signicantly related with negative attitudes to immigration, but only among highly educated people. Among workers with little education, attitudes to immigration are only signicantly associated with racial attitudes. This runs counter to what one would expect given that immigrants to the UK are more likely to be competing with low-skilled workers. However it is consistent with the notion that more educated people have stronger accuracy goals, and so have a stronger need to nd reasons to justify their opinions. The agent receives a signal about some aspect of the economic impact of immigrants: the signal σ = 0, received with probability 1 − ρ, is evidence that there should be fewer immigrants; σ = 1, occuring with probability ρ, indicates that there should be more immigrants . If σ = 1, the agent may try to forget or convince themselves it is false. They choose λ, the probability the information will be dismissed, at a pyschological cost M (λ). 10 The information that is recalled is thenσ = 1 if σ = 1 and the agent fails to dismiss the information, andσ = 1 otherwise.
Based on this recall, the agent forms a belief b = E [σ|σ], according to Bayes law as they are aware of their tendency to manipulate information . If σ = 1,
Finally the agent takes an action a = 0 (a = 1) which is to support a policy of reducing (increasing) the number of immigrants. The utility from from this action depends on three factors: the satisfaction of a directional goal, an accuracy goal, and the eort of manipulating information:
9 For a more detailed explanation and justication of the memory management side of this model, see Benabou and Tirole (2002) .
10 The case where M (λ) = 0 is considered in the section 2.2.
The parameter δ ≥ 0 represents the weight the agent places on the directional goal. This captures the preference for the agent to live in a society with fewer immigrants, and is increasing in strength of xenophobia, or preference for living in an ethnically homogenous country.
The parameter α ≥ 0 represents the strength of the accuracy goal (increasing in the desire to rationalize one's opinion). The function f (.) is the psychological cost of taking an action which is not justied by evidence, increasing in the distance of the action taken from what the agent believes to be objectively best,
Lemma 1 After receiving the signalσ = 0 the agent will always choose a = 0.
Proof : Suppose there is an equilibrium where the agent chooses a = 1 after
If the agent received the signalσ = 1 they would select a = 0 if and only if δ − αf (1) >
Therefore they must choose a = 1 regardless of the signal. This gives them an expected utility of
Lemma 2 After receiving the signalσ = 1 the agent will choose a = 1 if and only if δ < αf (1). c)
The equilibrim value of λ is decreasing in ρ. 
Proof
Dierentiating with respect to α gives:
Dierentiating the equilibrium condition with respect to δ gives:
11 For simplicity I am ignoring the constraint that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and assuming that parameters are such that solutions are interior. Convexity of M guarantees that if the rst order condition species λ < 0, then the constrained objective function is maximised at λ = 0, and if λ > 1 is specied then the optimal value is 1. This is also true for all the following maximisation problems. Strictly speaking in Proposition 3, increasing (decreasing) should be non-decreasing (non-increasing), the dierence only being relevant when the constraint on λ is binding.
12 Here a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is characterised by λ being chosen optimally given the assessment of the reliability of b 0 , and that assessment being determined by Bayes rule and the strategy used for selecting λ.
b)
If δ > αf (1), by Propositions 1 and 2, the agent solves max
, which gives the rst order con-
The condition for a perfect bayesian equilibrium is now:
Clearly the equilibrium condition is independent of δ.
c)
Dierentiating either equilibrium condition with respect to ρ gives: Figure 1 illustrates the rst two parts of the proposition when ρ = 0.5, f (x) = |x|, and M (λ) = 0.5λ
The graph shows what happens to the equilibrium value of λ when δ is held xed at 0.5 and α varies between zero and one. Two regimes emerge: one where the agent can be swayed by the evidence (δ < αf (1)), and one where their mind is already made up (δ > αf (1)).
Increasing δ increases the value of increasing λ only in so far as it increases the probability of choosing a = 0. If δ > αf (1), the agent always chooses a = 0, so there is no point in increasing λ further.
The diering eects of the accuracy goal can be understood as follows. There are two consequences of increasing λ: the probability of receiving favourable information is increased, and b is increased in the event thatσ = 0. Manipulation means that the agent is more likely to receive the information they want, but it will be of less value because in equilibrium they know the degree of manipulation. In the rst regime, strengthening the accuracy goal makes manipulation less desirable for two reasons: it directly reduces the benet of receiving the preferred signal because of the increase in α (the payo whenσ = 1 is unchanged because in this case a = b and there is no cost associated with the accuracy goal); it also indirectly reduces this benet by increasing the uncertainty that a = 0 is the correct action through the eect on b. Intuitively, the more the agent cares about making the correct decision, the less they will want to fool themselves given that they are aware of the self-deception.
When the signal is irrelevant to the decision of the agent, the costs of increasing the accuracy goal occur regardless of the signal that is recalled, but the increase will be greater whenσ = 1 because f (1) > f (b 0 )∀b 0 thus there will be an incentive to increase the probability of receiving the favoured information despite the associated increase in b 0 . Here there is a large benet of receiving a signal that makes them feel good about the decision they are bound to make anyway.
The only eect of an increase in ρ is to reduce the trustworthyness of the signalσ = 0. This reduces the value of manipulation in either regime.
A Variation: Selection of Media as Information Management
One major channel through which information about immigrants is acquired is the media. It could be argued that misperceptions about the economic impact of immigrants results simply from biased media. There are two major shortcomings with this argument. Firstly, where does the demand for biased media originate?
13 If people have existing prejudices, why do they need to be told what they already know. Secondly, people must be at least partially aware that the news they are receiving is biased if they are deliberately receiving it from a source they know to be biased, so why believe it?
These questions can be answered by a slight adjustment of the model presented in this paper. The parameter λ can be thought of as the degree of bias of a particular news-source, giving the agent a choice of a continuum of sources with bias ranging from zero to one. Now λ represents the probability that a story involving positive news about immigrants will be censored.
In most circumstances it would be unreasonable to suppose that selecting a more biased source would entail greater psychological costs (here the memory management equivalent, censoring, is done for you) so M (λ) will be set to zero. 14 Proposition 2 a) If δ < αf (1), the equilibrim value of λ is decreasing in α and ρ and increasing in δ.
b)
If δ > αf (1), in equilibrium λ = 1.
The dierences between Propositions 1 and 2 are entirely due to the absence of memory management costs. Without these costs it is always optimal for an individual with a suciently strong directional goal to isolate themselves completely from information that would contradict the position they want to (and certainly will) hold. They do this by choosing media that censors such information with probability one.
This model can resolve the two shortcomings mentioned above. There is demand for biased media when both directional and accuracy goals are present:
people want to read what they already know in order to justify opinions they have an exogenous desire to hold. Also, even when agents are perfectly rational, they can still fool themselves to some extent, making it benecial to consume media they know to be biased. 
where belief i is a dummy variable which equals one if a given belief is held, δ i and α i are measures of the strength of an individual's directional and accuracy goals, P i is a vector of variables that could increase the probability of receiving positive signals, X i is a vector of other control variables, and i is a random error.
The rst hypothesis that will be tested is that the probability that one believes that immigrants are good for the economy (which in equilibrium is equal to ρ(1 − λ)) is aected negatively by a preference against living in proximity to foreigners. This requires γ 0 < 0 .
Secondly, the eect of the accuracy goal should be negative for those with a strong directional goal, and positive for others. This would require the total eect of the γ 1 and γ 2 terms to be positive (negative 16 ) for high (low) values of
The hypothesis that a higher probability of receiving good signals about immigration leads to more pro-immigrant beliefs would be supported by γ 3 > 0. The results are robust to lifting this restriction.
The second uses responses to the statement it is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions. The variable sameculture takes a value from 1 if the respondent strongly disagrees with the statement, to 5 if they strongly agree.
These variables are indications of a desire to live in an ethnically or culturally homogenous society, which provides a reason to oppose immigration that is not related to its macroeconomic impact.
Accuracy goal
Again, I try two alternatives to proxy for the accuracy goal. The rst is years of education (educ). An essential part of education is training people to argue logically, present and defend ideas and arguments. More educated people should be more likely to feel that justifying decisions with evidence is desirable and feel a stronger need to do so. 21 Summary statistics of these variables can be found in Table 2 . X i also contains a full set of country dummies.
Results
The equation is estimated using a probit model.
22
Observations are weighted to take into account country population size and non-random sampling within countries as advised in the ESS guidelines. All four possible combinations of accuracy and direction goals are estimated. When nwsnp is used, years of education is also controlled for to account for aspects of education not related to accuracy concerns. Results are presented in Table 3 . The marginal eect of the interaction term is calculated using the inte Stata command. 23 20 0 (no time at all), 1 (less than 1/2 hour), 2 (1/2 hour to 1 hour), 3 (more than 1 hour, up to 1 1/2 hours), 4 (more than 1 1/2 hour, up to 2 hours), 5 (more than 2 hour, up to 2 1/2 hours), 6 (more than 2 1/2 hour, up to 3 hours), 7 (more than 3 hours).
21 1 = less than 150 Euro monthly; 2= 150-300 Euro; 3= 300-500; 4 = 500-1000; 5 = 1000-1500; 6 = 1500-2000; 7 = 2000-2500; 8 = 2500-3000; 9 = 3000-5000; 10 = 5000-7500; 11 = 7500-10000; 12 = more than 10000
22 The results are qualitatively unchanged when OLS is used 23 For details of the program, and why it is necessary, see Ai et al. (2004) The eect of a preference against living with people of a dierent ethnicity is strongly associated with a reduction in the probability of holding beliefs about a positive economic impact of immigrants: the coecients are all negative, and mostly signicant. This eect is large, reducing the probability of holding positive beliefs by between 3 and 18 percentage points. A preference for cultural homogeneity has a similar eect.
The coecient on the interaction term is also always negative, and signicant for half the regressions. To give an idea of the magnitude of this eect we can consider the change implied by increasing the number of years of education from 12 to 16 (roughly the dierence between completion of high school and completion of a university degree) for dierent values of ideallive. For ideallive = 0, the probability that the respondent believes that immigrants are good for the economy increases by 8.4%, whereas if the respondent has a strong preference against living near people of a dierent ethnicity the increase is only 5.9%.
Someone who spends more than 3 hours per day reading news about politics and current aairs is 18.9% more likely to believe that immigration creates employment than someone who spends no time if they have no preference for cultural homogeneity (sameculture =1), however that gure is only 2.6% if they have a strong preference (sameculture =5).
24
The total eect of an increase in years of education and nwsnp is always ideallive. 26
The only variable that is signicant with dierent signs for dierent beliefs is male: men are more likely to believe that immigrants increase employment and decrease wages. This is consistent with men thinking in terms of a simple supply and demand set-up. Immigration (an increase in labour supply), would then have those eects. Men are also more likely to think that immigration is good for the economy in general, which is a possible contradiction my assumption that respondents to the survey would consider a reduction in wages as a negative impact.
People living in a rural area are less likely to believe that immigrants have a negative scal impact. This could be because immigrants in rural areas are more likely to work in cash-in-hand jobs and thus pay less tax than immigrants working in urban areas.
Robustness
The rst claim for robustness is the similarity in patterns of eects of accuracy goals, directional goals, and their interaction across a range of economic beliefs and using combinations of two dierent proxies for preferences. The importance of the range of beliefs is discussed in section 4.
Several alternative denitions of the dependent variable have been tested: retaining the original values from the questionnaire (0-10, for econ, scal, and jobs; 1-5 for wage), and using a dummy variable as in the reported results but either eliminating the middle value or giving it a value of 1 instead of 0. The major dierences are in the signicance of the interaction terms; other results are for the most part unchanged.
27 When the middle value is excluded, all interaction terms are negative, with seven being signicant at the 1 or 5% level.
However, when the middle value is set to 1, ve of the 16 possible interaction 26 Using left-right in place of ideallive in the interaction term nds signicant and negative interaction eects for dependent variables scal and wage. The interaction coecients on econ and jobs are also negative. Using imfr instead gives positive coecients on the interaction terms as predicted, signicant at the 5% level in the scal regression.
27 A notable exception is the eect of male on scal, which loses signicance when the middle value is excluded, and becomes signicantly negative when the middle value is set to 1.
terms become positive (but none signicant), with only one being both negative and signicant. Using all values, 14 out of 16 interaction terms are negative, but only one signicantly so.
Two things make the reported dependent variables most appropriate. Firstly, a dummy variable is preferable to the values reported in the questionnaire, because it should reduce measurement error: only the extremes of the scale (0 and 10) were clearly dened, so it is not clear that one person who gave a response of 8 is really more rm in their belief than a dierent person who responded with a 7. On the other hand, it does seem reasonable to assume that a response below the middle value indicates a belief in the opposite direction to a response above the middle value, and that the middle value indicates no rm belief. Secondly, the middle value has been included with negative beliefs because it ts better the idea behind the model, and also the evidence from psychology experiments: people forget or dismiss information they do not want;
they are not at liberty to invent beliefs that suit them.
Discussion
Negative beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants are strongly related to a desire to live in an ethnically homogenous area. It is dicult to explain this without recourse to something like motivated reasoning. The beliefs are related to the macroeconomy whereas the explanatory variable relates to the locality the respondent would like to live in. For the belief that immigrants have a negative scal impact one could create a chain of reasoning that this belief coincides with a belief that immigrants tend to be unemployed, thus poorer, and so the areas they live in are less desirable, and if immigrants are also believed to be from a dierent ethnic group then this would explain the correlation. On the other hand, this sort of argument falls down for beliefs about immigrants taking jobs from natives. The range of beliefs considered here is particularly important, as it suggests that the link between xenophobia and beliefs is not based on simple stereotypes.
If the reason that people didn't want to live around members of a dierent ethnicity was because of negative stereotypes about characteristics of that ethnicity, such as laziness or criminality, then one would expect them to have negative beliefs about the impact immigration of people of that ethnicity on the economy in general and on government nances. However these negative stereotypes are not consistent with the beliefs that immigrants take jobs from natives and work for low wages, which would suggest immigrants are not lazy but at least as hard-working as natives. All beliefs studied here, whether they imply positive or negative stereotypes of immigrants, are inuenced in the same way by proxies for accuracy goals, directional goals and their interactions.
Alternative explanations and objections about choice of proxies may be raised against any given regression presented here, but the fact that the results are so consistent across a variety of proxies and beliefs, speaks loudly in favour of this model of motivated reasoning.
These results demonstrate all kinds of diculties in analysing the determi- The rst problem with using beliefs is one of reverse causality: rather than wanting less immigration because they believe immigrants have a harmful impact, people may believe immigrants have a harmful impact because they want fewer immigrants. Secondly, the desire to reduce immigration and beliefs that immigrants are harmful are both partly determined by xenophobia, resulting in missing variable bias if this is not carefully controlled for.
Education and a high skill-level, both often used in looking for the role of economic self interest in attitudes towards immigrants, are strongly correlated with positive beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants, and negatively correlated with xenophobia.
Finally, it is dangerous to interpret GDP as simply a proxy for skill-levels in a country as has been done in some previous papers, because it is also signicantly negatively correlated with average levels of xenophobia. The sample includes only citizens of the majority ethnic group. Marginal eects holding all other variables at their mean value are shown with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. The marginal eect, standard errors and statistical signicance of the interaction terms are calculated using the stata program inte.ado written by Edward Norton et al. *signicant at 10% **signicant at 5% ***signicant at 1%. Country dummies are included in all estimations (coecients not shown). Observations are weighted according to ESS guidelines.
